TREATISE ON FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

SUBJECT 2: THE SUBJECT OF THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY: THE MAN.

2,1  Nature of the human being.

2.1.1  Being the man who from his intelligence intellectually orders the world that surrounds assigning name and definition to him to each one by the thing, its greater difficulty arises when there is to define themselves to itself and to analyze his own nature.

2.1.2  In the measurement that a science reduces to others, the nature of the reduced ones is identified perfectly in the parameters that justify it. In the paradigm of the intellectual universe each thing is what its essence or nature can be preached of, since unknown or inexplicable at the most can be object of enunciation without definition until some science can unravel and reduce under some law the singular elements that characterize it.

2.1.3  Being the human being in the superior vertex of the intellectual pyramid, it can by means of the analysis get to know the law that orders everybody material, but its own intellectual identity cannot be well-known but by reflection, because no knowledge can be reduced or at the same time be included to itself like in an only act knowing and to be well-known, since the well-known would not fit as reduced in the own act to know but by reflection or reflected contemplation the same act.

2.1.4  All the material of the man appears as a state of the matter and for that reason it can be defined according to the law of that state, but the unit of the person in its globalidad of psychological being escapes to the determination that could be hoped of the conjunction of its material formantes.

2.1.5  The greater stumbling block is not in the differences of behavior of the different people, nor in the differentiation of the own personal acts, but in the conscience of freedom for the intellectual exercise.

2.1.6  The basic characteristics of the human being is not that it can think abstractions from the assimilated singular perceptions by means of impulses sensible, process and recreated in the mind, but that to those thoughts corresponds an indetermine answer, nontie necessarily to a law of action-reaction, but intelectualizada, creative, frees.

2.1.7  This way of being human characterizes to him like a being of double procedure: fisico-mental and the psico-intellectual. This double joint in a responsible unit is what it has induced the definition of person like being singular of intellectual nature. The singularity would be the characteristic of material order organized unitarily and informed by an equally unique and own intellectual substance forming a set unitary and different capable to  the creative resource.

2.1.8  To conceive the double procedure of the man as a genuine unit demands that the intellectual acts turn on the mental acts. The abstraction or idea, the thought that knows and relates the mental activity to the outer physical reality, is the dismaterial image that informs the spiritual intuition enabling it to act in a certain sense. Proportionally to the maturation of that intuition the intellectuality is sustained, the creativity is developed and the freedom is generated.

2.1.9  The definition of the essence of the human being as a unit of double fisico-mental and psico-intellectual procedure surpasses the stumbling block of the materialistic and spiritualist conceptions of the human being. First they result in the negation of a real freedom for the person necessarily. Second they discarnate the man until leading it to a idealismo irresponsibly broken ties with the material reality.

2.2  The freedom in the man.

2.2.1  The freedom is first of all a dynamic faculty that moves to build with intellectual dominion on the produced act.

2.2.2  Of the acts of the man, although all belong to the person, also more primarily material or reflected, all cannot be considered free: those are only considered like such that contain a commitment of intellectual dominion.

2.2.3  Physiological activities like growing, breathing, to be goign grey, to cry; or sentimental activities like loving, becoming angry, to become demoralized themselves, to have antipathy; they correspond to human acts that cannot be considered free because they are not consequence of an intelligent decision assessing, but of an operative answer motivated by an outer stimulus. It is certain that all these activities intellectually are known and an implicit consent will can even be granted on the same ones, but, somehow, the dominion of its production is excluded from the empire of the will habitually, because the same act is known like spontaneous or necessary under a certain situation of influences.

2.2.4  So that an act can be free, the primary foundation is that the intellect knows it like free. The vill of exercise only follows the form to be, and what it is perceived as own of the personal dominion by the intellect can cause free decisions. For that reason, the freedom in addition of as faculty is constituted like intellectual habit.

2.2.5  Who maintain the impossibility of the exercise of the freedom denies the own intellectual experience to behave with dominion on the made act. The intellectual activity would be reduced to know the determinations which they induce its acts, but without which there is potentially creativity possibility, to synthesize variables that form a personal form of answer that is ordered to execute to the will.

2.2.6  In some analyses of the thought the freedom to the faculty to choose or to decide between a variable  of stimuli is had tie. This perspective is confused, since the reality of the diversity of stimuli and possibility of deciding on such does not justify that there is not a stimulus considerable than the others in each opportunity, and that really does not follow an election but a lead answer.

2.2.7  The mark of the freedom is in which the intellect before a suggestion or devises, is only or multiple, projects an own valuation sustained in its intuitions or experiences, that a personal decision originates to build of that certain way, either is adhering without the more to the suggestion, choosing between several possibilities, or staying out to build.

2.2.8   Until where and how much it is what the intellect is implied in each judgment, or on the contrary is to liabilities and reflection, is what determines the intellectual habit of each personality. To be free is a way of being own of the human person; indeed that free being constitutes to him the capable for greater or smaller development of his faculties.

2.2.9  It could think that the freedom was conditional to the power of the mind, that is to the paradigm of ideas or synthesis able to formulate each person, but it is only certain partly. An open mind provides much greater information for the decision making of intelligence, but the discernment to act of this one is not necessarily proportional to that. The freedom more would be linked to the wisdom that to the knowledge, although this one appears like an inexhaustible source of resources so that the wisdom pronounces its splendor yet.

2.2.10  From the intellectual knowledge that allows to act with voluntary dominion of the act, the responsibility of the effect of the act is derived on the surrounding nature. The human acts or are spontaneous, and therefore natural, or are intelligent and consequently assume the knowledge that had of its impact in the next reality.

2.2.11  The voluntary human acts being creative modify the configuration of the surroundings. The positive or negative influence of the acts in the other beings different from the subject is what it is understood by responsibility.

2.2.12  The human being by the responsibility of the influence of his acts assumes a ethics, that is, adjustment of his acts to the good. The ethics that is, partly, innate in the intelectivas intuitions is developed and enriched by the experience, and constitutes the conscience that judges the good that is derived from the free acts.

2.2.13  The arrangement of the experience is not only formed by the reflection of the incidence of the own decisions, but that is constructed by the assimilation of the study of the importance of the contemporary and historical other people's acts.

2.2.14  The responsibility also concerns to each person in the scope to fortify its experience, with the application of the common sense and the study, to behave with greater knowledge and freedom.

2.3  Its creativity.

2.3.1  The creativity of the human being is in the possibility of designing and of executing novel applications with the existing elements in the nature.

2.3.2  This creativity is consequence of its intellectual capacity, that generates intuitions of progressto which it applies his memory and the ability of its mind to rationalize a greater yield to its service of the goods to which it has access.

2.3.3  The first link of the application of  the creative knowledge assumes is exemplary, that is, of the perception of the natural processes of cause-effect it concluded the possibility of building imitating such to obtain an improved application.

2.3.4  The faculty of the memory allows him to retain the progress in the effect derived from the concurrence or application of a cause, and by means of its language to trasmitir it to the same types and the descendants.

2.3.5  The human creativity, although is a tie personal faculty to the intellect, presents a great social dependency because practically the totality of the mental knowledge is constructed on learned ideas that they constitute the cultural patrimony of the preceding generations.

2.3.6  The creativity supposes an intuitive application to rearrange a natural effect and not the simple benefit of the use of the effect of practical way. In this one is different the creativity and the human progress from the one of other alive species, because these adjust in his to build for the greater own benefit only according to the experience of the sensible knowledge. The man, however, not only applies that form of utility, but that devises intellectually its progress and next he gradually creates the resources until obtaining it.

2.3.7  A great memory by itself does not justify the creative progress, because no matter how much infinity of data is computed and they interrelate to each other, without a planned objective is not constructed the corresponding application.

2.3.8  A stumbling block appears when it is tried to judge if the evolutionary process of the matter is creative or no. Some consider that evolution like creative, but it only can be admitted as soon as that the intuition on the future effect was assumed in the cause.

2.3.9  What distinguishes to the creative act of the man of the simple evolution of the matter is that its application does not follow the line of waited for progression, but that it modifies and it disturbs the natural process constituting in subject assets of the process and not transmitting liabilities. It is showed in the disturbance of the process, making the man practically instantaneous transformations in relation the time that of the law of well-known evolution could be expected.

2.3.10  This influence of the creative effect of the man on the nature has to him with a great responsibility, as soon as that the same one in the general order will have to be constructed with a view to the compatibility of the conservation of a nature, without whose scope of relation the life of the man is not viable.

2.4  Its social qualification.

2.4.1  To be social is the one that is developed in group with its resemblances. The human beings and the practical totality of the beings alive beings grow in colectivity. He denominates himself to the group like social if relations exist voluntary that they perfect to his members.

2.4.2  The foundation of the society is necessary to find it in the same nature that establishes the necessity of relation between the individuals of the same species for as essential aims as the procreation and perpetuaciĆ³n of the species.

2.4.3  The man, therefore, is able for the life in society by exigency of his nature, and for it he is equipped with the sensible organs that allow him to know and to be related to the other individuals of the species.

2.4.4  The social capacity of the human being is superior to the one of other species because by his intellectual constitution it is grouped for, by means of converging its creative faculties, to construct a space of progress in benefit of all the individuals of the group.

2.4.5  Between the most important manifestations of his social creativity it is the preparation of a language of double joint that allows him with a limited number of units to combine them to obtain a limitless amount of expresivas units.

2.4.6  In the same measurement in which he is free, the man dominates his social allegiance. Although its inclusion to a group comes given to him to be born in the same one, its own dynamics can move to change to him of group. Somehow each man is called to construct the social group according to his ideals and in it is the last foundation of the democracy like conjunction of the wills of government of the individuals of an organized colectivity.